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1 Introduction
Integration processes in Europe resulted in intensification of migration flows. Immi-
grants account now for a large share of population in many European countries. For
example, in 2011 immigrants account for more than 10% in Belgium, more than 12% in
Spain, around 10% in Austria, almost 9% in Germany (OECD [2012]). This naturally
leads to wide labor policy debates. One of the most important questions is whether
immigrants affect the level of native employment. A point of view that immigrants take
jobs form natives is quite widespread. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism
and Xenophobia published a special analysis of the attitudes towards minorities in EU
countries Eurobarometer 2000. They found that one in two EU citizens worry about
competing with immigrants for the same vacancies and afraid of losing their jobs be-
cause of presence of foreign workers (Thalhammer et al. [2001]). Different measures and
institutions which protect native workers have nevertheless an ambiguous effect. On
the one hand labor protective institutions such as minimal wage, replacement rate or
firing restrictions will protect existing workers and reduce a firing rate. On the other
hand, firms will take into consideration these additional costs of firing and will be less
likely to employ new workers. At the same time, it is argued that immigrants are prob-
ably less likely to be covered by these institutions since they are more likely to work in
non-unionized jobs, on short-term fixed contract or even illegally (Angrist and Kugler
[2003]). In addition, immigrants, being new on the labor market, may be less aware
of employment protection regulations and less likely to claim their rights in court (Sa
[2011]). These facts imply that protective institutions cover mostly natives and therefore
make immigration labor force comparatively less costly. Labor market protection may
therefore amplify a negative effect of immigrants on native employment if it exists.
Another interesting idea is that the effect of protective institutions can be not per-
manent but changing over time (Z. and Yashiv [2002], or Jean and Jimnez [2011]). It
is quite natural to assume that immigrants enter a product market more quickly than
a labor market. So immigration inflow boosts a product demand and therefore a labor
demand first and only on the later stages progressively increases labor supply (Z. and
Yashiv [2002]). As a result a negative effect of immigration can be delayed in time.
This paper attempts to evaluate the effect of immigration inflow on employment
level of natives and reveal whether this effect changes in different institutional envi-
ronment using EU-countries data. In addition to static specification it uses a dynamic
specification to draw conclusions about long-term and short-term effects separately. The
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief literature review. Section 3 presents
a replication of the one of the most important and cited paper in described area - pa-
per of Angrist and Kugler [2003]. In addition, some critical questions are raised here.
Section 4 evaluates the similar specification using more recent data and time-varying
indicator for institutional restrictions. Section 5 then turns to a dynamic specification.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
The effect of immigration inflow on national labor market is a quite popular topic for
research. However, the results are not so obvious and there is no common point of view
in the literature. Pope D. and Winters G. (1993) paper, for example, was one of the first.
Their approach based mostly on the theoretical framework and provided no evidence of
immigration influence on native employment level. Pischke and Velling [1997] analyzed
the impact of increased immigration on employment outcomes for natives in Germany
using the change in immigrants share as an independent variable. They used previ-
ous labor market outcomes to control for immigrants self-selection problem. As results
suggest, there is no evidence of any displacement effect. Weyerbrock [1995] computed
a general equilibrium model for EU and concluded that a negative effect of immigra-
tion, like increasing unemployment or decreasing wages, is very small even with a large
immigration flows. Longhi [2005] reviewed 165 different estimates form nine different
studies for different OECD countries. They found that negative effect from immigrants is
stronger for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers but on average is almost negligible.
More recent researches use different and more comprehensive techniques. Winter-Ebmer
and Zweimuller [2000] employed a probit model and a Weibull duration model. Using
data from Austria they showed that there is no effect on employment probability and
unemployment duration (see also Gang and Rivera-Batiz [1994] for analysis for EU).
Morley [2006] turned to time-series ARDL specification and tested causality tests for
Australia, Canada and the USA. He showed that causality goes form GDP to migration
and not vice versa. Therefore, any independent policy which aims to control immigra-
tion processes could not be fully successful.
However, one can not conclude that there is no effect at all. Firstly, the effect
can change over time and therefore there is a need to distinguish between long- and
short-term prospectives. Damette and Fromentin [2000] used non-stationary panel data
methodology with data from 14 OECD countries. They estimated a trivariate Vector
Error Correction Model and derived causality tests to simultaneously assess the long-
and short-term macroeconomic impact of newcomers. The results suggest that an in-
crease of immigrants is likely to increase wages only in the short run and they also found
an evidence of adverse effects on unemployment due to immigration for Anglo-Saxon
countries in the short term.
In general, there are several basic approaches to estimate the immigration effect on lo-
cal labor market as comprehensively described in Okkerse [2008]. Geographical method
is a comparison of regions with different shares of immigrants (examples here areAltonji
and Card [1991] and Card [2001]). There can be several problems here. First, both
labor market conditions and immigration inflows can be simultaneously affected by un-
observable regional shocks. Secondly, and more importantly, immigrants choose where
to settle not exogenously. They often decide to move to the regions with good labor
market conditions. On the other hand, immigration inflows themselves may worsen a
labor market situation in the region. So, the causality can go in both directions. As
Okkerse [2008] pointed out, the resulting correlation between these two variables will
measure a net effect and not just one causal relationship. One way to resolve these
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problems is to use instrumental variables. This could be a reform or political event that
affects immigration flows but is not correlated with wage or level of unemployment on
the local labor market. Of course it is quite difficult to find appropriate instruments in
this case. For instance, Sa [2011] provides evidence of institutional effect on immigra-
tion displacement for the EU countries based on two natural experiments (government
reforms) for Spain and Italy. Other examples are Altonji and Card [1991] and Card
[2001]). Although, one should note that natives can also respond to immigration entry
by moving to another region (Okkerse [2008], Borjas [1999], Card [2001]). Another way
of dealing with endogeneity is to control for the share of immigrants in the previous
period. This method based on the idea, that people often decided to move to the area
where there is already a settlement of previous immigrants so they can benefit from
friends or relatives network (Pischke and Velling [1997], Schoeni [1997] and others).
Other methods to estimate displacement effect of immigration are, for example, es-
timation of a production function and elasticity with respect to labor or time-series
approach which allows for Granger causality tests (see Layard et al. 1991, Pope and
Withers [1993]).
An effect of labor market institutions is also described in a wide class of the literature.
Beginning with Blanchard and Wolfers [2000], who used EU data and showed a positive
effect of protective institutions on unemployment level. Namely, more protective insti-
tutions lead to a large effect of negative labor demand shocks. Jean and Jimnez [2011]
asses the same effect for OECD countries and the role of economic policy to adjust for
such an effect. He found no long-run effect and showed that short-run effect can be
observed in a strict institutional environment with stringent product market regulation,
high replacement rate or unemployment benefits. Sa [2011] provides evidence of insti-
tutional effect on immigration displacement for the EU countries. The results suggest
that strict employment protection legislation gives immigrants a comparative advantage
relative to natives. Stricter employment protection reduces hiring and firing rates for
natives but has a much smaller effect on immigrants.
Angrist and Kugler [2003] paper took a fresh look on the immigration consequences
in Western Europe using a quasi-experiment design and constructing instruments based
on the Balkan Wars. The authors tried to find out whether the high and persistent
level of unemployment in Europe is caused by specific labor protection institutions. The
paper therefore provided a new insight into both immigration displacement and insti-
tutional effects at the same time and based on both classes of the described literature.
In addition, Angrist and Kugler found a significant and negative effect of immigration
inflow for some model specifications, which makes it interesting to compare the paper
with previous studies. Next section presents the paper in more details and replicates
the main tables.
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3 Replication
Angrist and Kugler ”Protective or counter-productive? Labor market institutions and
the effect of immigration on EU natives?” paper (2003) addresses the immigration effect
on native employment along with the role of institutions in determining this effect. The
authors use a panel data set from European Commission statistical agency-Eurostat for
European Economic Area countries for 1983-1999. They begin with simple evaluation
of immigration effect for all countries, using the following specification.
ln(yijt) = µi + δt + βj + αi ln(sjt) + ijt (1)
where ln(yijt) is the log of the employment-to-population ratio for natives and ln(sjt) is
the log of the immigrant (non-national) proportion in labor force for demographic group
i, (e.g. men or women) country j, year t. The coefficients αi for younger (under 40)
and older (over 40) men and women can be observed in Table 1 which are replication
of Table 3 in Angrist and Kugler1. First three columns present result for specification
as in equation (1), while the columns (4)-(6) are extended with country specific trends
β0j + β1jt instead of dummy βj. This extension address the concern that in the long
time-series data migration could be correlated with country specific trend. The original
specification will give biased results in this case. Alternative specification removes a
trend or near-trend component in immigration.
In the original specification the effect is negligible overall and significant for young
native men only. When country specific trends are added, the coefficients for men
becomes insignificant and coefficient for women becomes negative and significant.
Table 1: Basic Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
With trends With trends With trends
Pooled Under 40 Over 40 Pooled Under 40 Over 40
Men -0.0096 -0.021*** 0.0023 -0.0094 -0.011 -0.0074
(0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0045) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0060)
Observations 422 211 211 420 211 211
Women 0.00017 0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0125 -0.0221* -0.0029
(0.028) (0.013) (0.022) (0.0342) (0.0132) (0.012)
Observations 422 211 211 420 211 211
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1We used the same data set and some codes provided on Angrist Data Archive
http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/angrist/data1/data/angkug03
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We can conclude that the effect for men are mostly driven by common trend in immi-
gration and employment. The effect for women are vise versa permanent and does not
depend on time-varying component. Although these results are very preliminary.
As was described in the previous section a geographical approach to estimation of
migration effect suffers from unobservable local productivity and labor demand shocks.
Angrist and Kugler use the log of share of immigrants with EU nationality ln(ujt) to
control (partially) for local demand factors that may increase the overall immigration.
In addition, it will be interesting to see whether the internal migration acts to offset
negative effect of external migration. The fact that ln(ujt) is potentially endogenous
should not bias the following IV estimation if instruments are uncorrelated with migra-
tion from other EU countries(Angrist and Kugler [2003]).
Table 2 presents the results for specification with EU-share. For models without
country specific trends the coefficient for younger men becomes large and overall effect
becomes significant from zero. An increase of immigration by 10% costs about 0.21%
of native jobs. In addition, the effect of internal immigration is positive and significant
which means that migration within EU indeed reduces negative effect of external im-
migration. In other words, estimation considering immigrants all together leads to the
insignificant coefficients. But this is resulted from the fact that external and internal
immigration affect employment in different directions and one need to distinguish be-
tween them. For women none of the results are significant in specification without trends.
Table 2: Specification with EU-share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
With trends With trends With trends
Pooled Under 40 Over 40 Pooled Under 40 Over 40
Men non-EU -0.021** -0.037*** -0.0039 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010
(0.0080) (0.0076) (0.0054) (0.015) (0.012) (0.0071)
EU 0.036** 0.053*** 0.018* 0.022 0.028*** 0.016**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.0095) (0.019) (0.0093) (0.0063)
Observations 402 201 201 402 201 201
Women non-EU -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.012 -0.023* -0.0018
(0.032) (0.016) (0.026) (0.048) (0.012) (0.015)
EU 0.086* 0.092*** 0.081** 0.0083 0.018* -0.0016
(0.047) (0.026) (0.031) (0.049) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 402 201 201 402 201 201
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In specifications with country trends the effect for men is zero as before. For women
the coefficient is significant for younger women only and approximately the same as for
men -0.23%. Internal immigration of younger women has a positive effect as for men
but lower in magnitude.
As Angrist and Kugler pointed out, inclusion of country specific trends and EU-shares
does not, of course, eliminate the problem of endogenous immigration decisions. To deal
with an endogeneity problem, an IV strategy is used. The authors used two Balkan
Wars as natural quasi-experiments and constructed instruments based on the distance
from the wars’ main centers. This motivated by the fact, that ”the flow from former
Yugoslavia became an important part of the European migration picture after 1990 with
the number of former Yugoslavian asylum-seekers peaked in 1992 (Bosnia War) and in
1999 when NATO launched air strikes in the Kosovo War. Yugoslavs accounted for more
than 30% of asylum-seekers in the war years” (Angrist and Kugler [2003]). As a result
the distance from Bosnia and Kosovo intersected with the war years may be potentially
good instruments for the intensity of the immigration inflows. To examine this proposal
the first-stage equation (2) is estimated.
ln(sjt) = τt + ψj + bjtpib + njtpin + kjtpik + ijt (2)
where j represents country as before, i - a demographic group, τ and ψ - are year and
country dummies,
bjt - the distance from Sarajevo × dummy for 1991-95 (Bosnia War)
njt - the distance from Sarajevo × dummy for 1996-97 (inter war years)
kjt - the distance from Pristina × dummy for 1998-98 (Kosovo War)
are excluded instruments.
As before the specifications with and without country trends are considered. Moreover,
the distance could be measured as a distance from the capital of from the nearest big
(in terms of population) city. All specifications are presented in Table 3.
As we can see, all the instruments are significant in all cases. Larger distance from
former Yugoslavia is associated with a lower immigrants share during war years. For
example, in countries 500 miles away from War centers (like for example Graz, Austria)
a share of immigrants is lower by on average 30%. The inter-war period dummy is also
significant and has negative coefficient witch could be explained by a prolonged effect
of Bosnia war. The pre-war dummy is not significant for most specifications wich is
encouraging since it indicates no long-run trend associated with distance form Sarajevo.
As an additional check Angrist and Kugler tried the same instruments for EU-nationals
and found no influence proving that results in Table 3 indeed reflect the effect of former
Yugoslav immigrants.
For the second stage, Table 4, the authors used distance from big city and estimate
once again specifications with and without country trends.
Results for men are significant in pooled version without trends (-0.05) and even large
for younger men (-0.08). The coefficients now become larger than with OLS estimation
namely 10% increase in immigrants share leads to a 0,5% decrease of employment for
native men overall. Supposing that the IV estimates are more precise, we can say that
these results quite high, especially in comparison with the similar studies for US.
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Table 4: IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Polled Under 40 Over 40 Polled Under 40 Over 40
No trends No trends No trends With trends With trends With trends
Men -0.050** -0.082*** -0.018 0.019 0.020 0.017
(0.022) (0.027) (0.015) (0.025) (0.022) (0.014)
Observations 422 211 211 422 211 211
Women -0.24** -0.19*** -0.30*** -0.019 0.0038 -0.042
(0.11) (0.063) (0.093) (0.13) (0.024) (0.034)
Observations 422 211 211 422 211 211
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As Angrist and Kugler noted, this could be explained, perhaps, by more restrictive
protective institutions in Europe. Inclusion of trends make all the results insignificant,
showing that trend component plays an important role in determining the displacement
effect of immigration for men.
Results for women now become significantly negative but too large in magnitude. On
the other hand, when country specific trends are added non of the results are significantly
distinguishable from zero. This all suggest that results for women are probably driven
by factors other then migration and these other factor are correlated with distance from
Sarajevo and Bosnia and changing over time (Distance from Pristina is indeed has highly
significant explanatory power for women native employment, as we additional checked).
One possible explanation, suggested by Angrist and Kugler is a labor force participation.
Women labor force participation increased a lot during the period under review and this
growth happened to be larger in countries father from former Yugoslavia (Angrist and
Kugler [2003]). Therefore, it is not fully appropriate to use provided instrument for
identification of the effect for women.
Adding EU-share as a control has little effect on estimates (Angrist and Kugler [2003])
which seems reasonable since we already controlled for endogenity by using IV. These
result are therefore not provided.
Finally, Angrist and Kugler proceed with estimation the effect of institutions. Estima-
tion is conducted for men only since for women the instrument used are correlated with
employment, with and without country trends. The estimated model is very similar but
now the institutional indicator xj is added.
ln(yijt) = µi + δt + βj + (αoi + α1ixj) ln(sjt) + ijt (3)
Here µi and δt are dummies for demographic group and year, country dummy βj
replaced by country trend in some specifications.
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To describe an institutional environment Angrist and Kugler used three indicators:
• Labor standards including the employment protection, restriction on working hours
and employment contracts, administrative or unions control, minimum wages.
• Replacement rate (average level)
• Entry costs which are an index of barriers to entrepreneurship
First two indicators are taken from Nickell and Jackman [1991]. Labor standard ex-
pressed as an index ranging from 0 to 7 (7 for the most restrictive institutions), replace-
ment rate ranges from 20 to 90%. Entry barriers are taken from Nicoletti et al. [2000]
and expressed as an index ranging from 0.5 to 2.75.
Because all three institutional indicators are measured in different ways they are stan-
dardized for comparability purpose. The coefficient αoi is therefore represents the effect
for country with average institutions and α1i shows how the effect changes with one
standard deviation change in institutional indicator x. The result are provided in Table
52.
First three columns present an OLS estimation. The main effect of immigration is
significant and negative in all the cases. 10 percentage higher immigration inflow results
in 0.23-0.27 percentage lower native employment. Interaction with institutions prove
the authors’ hypothesis about negative effect of protective institutions. All three insti-
tutional indicators have negative coefficients when considered individually. For example,
stricter (by one standard deviation) labor standards will increase immigration displace-
ment effect on native employment by 0.011% for older men, for 0.02% for younger men
and for 0.015% overall. Estimation of all three types of institutional indicators together
gives a less clear results, main effect becomes larger for younger men and therefore on
average and interaction term is significant for replacement rate only. SLS estimation
provides larger negative effect of labor standards and of entry barriers (for older men
and overall). Results for replacement rate are not significant. Main effect is significant
and quite large in specification with entry barriers and with all the institutions together.
The question appears here is why to use constant institutional indicators in quite
long time-series. We saw already that time component plays an important role in de-
termining the effect and it would be also interesting to take into account any trends
in institutional environment itself. Last panel of the Table5 presents the results with
composite institutional indicator taken from OECD [2003] database 3. This coefficient
is time-varying and ranges from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most stringent). Coefficients
provided by OLS estimation are quite the same as before. Main effect coefficient is sig-
nificant in pooled regression and indicates 0.29% decrease of native employment when
2The results in Table 5 are slightly different from those in the original paper. It may be explained
by a slightly different data which could be traced by a number of observations. Another possible
explanation lays in calculations. For example, we used mean and sd functions to create standardized
variables while authors wrote directly the numbers. One should note also that original code provided
by authors was written in SAS and our calculations are done in STATA. In total, the differences are
note crucial and do not change the main conclusions.
3http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm#data
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Table 5: Immigration effect: Interaction with Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS SLS SLS SLS
Pooled Under 40 Over 40 Pooled Under 40 Over 40
Labor standards
Main effect -0.023* -0.039*** -0.0064 -0.010 -0.044 0.023
(0.013) (0.013) (0.0087) (0.024) (0.034) (0.020)
Labor standards -0.015** -0.020** -0.011** -0.073*** -0.094*** -0.052***
(0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0051) (0.027) (0.035) (0.018)
Observations 334 167 167 334 167 167
Replacement rate
Main effect -0.024* -0.041*** -0.0074 0.050 0.11 -0.0089
(0.013) (0.013) (0.0087) (0.049) (0.076) (0.036)
Replacement rate -0.016* -0.019* -0.014** 0.0072 0.00010 0.014
(0.0088) (0.011) (0.0063) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013)
Observations 334 167 167 334 167 167
Entry barriers
Main effect -0.027*** -0.044*** -0.010* -0.049*** -0.091*** -0.0061
(0.0098) (0.0092) (0.0062) (0.013) (0.027) (0.011)
Entry Barriers -0.020** -0.024** -0.015** -0.034* -0.0088 -0.060***
(0.0096) (0.011) (0.0067) (0.019) (0.030) (0.017)
Observations 368 184 184 368 184 184
Labor standards and replacement rate
Immigrants share -0.022* -0.038*** -0.0061 -0.012 -0.047 0.022
(0.013) (0.013) (0.0086) (0.026) (0.043) (0.014)
Labor standards -0.012 -0.017* -0.0082 -0.058*** -0.094*** -0.021**
(0.0077) (0.0084) (0.0053) (0.022) (0.033) (0.011)
Replacement rate -0.013 -0.014 -0.011* -0.015 -0.028 -0.0021
(0.0085) (0.0100) (0.0063) (0.015) (0.023) (0.010)
Observations 334 167 167 334 167 167
All three institutions
Immigrants share -0.031** -0.048*** -0.015 -0.069** -0.12*** -0.012
(0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.031) (0.044) (0.018)
Labor standards -0.0021 -0.0057 0.0015 0.031 0.041 0.021
(0.013) (0.016) (0.0097) (0.019) (0.025) (0.014)
Replacement rate -0.015** -0.017 -0.014** 0.0079 0.0092 0.0066
(0.0077) (0.011) (0.0061) (0.011) (0.016) (0.0092)
Entry Barriers -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 -0.090*** -0.13*** -0.048**
(0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.031) (0.047) (0.020)
Observations 334 167 167 334 167 167
Labor protection (OECD indicator)
Immigrants share -0.029*** -0.012 0.0078 -0.031 0.059 0.034**
(0.0088) (0.011) (0.0074) (0.020) (0.041) (0.016)
Labor protection 0.0026** -0.0088*** -0.0048** -0.0033 -0.030*** -0.013***
(0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0041) (0.0091) (0.0036)
Observations 343 165 178 343 165 178
Instruments used are as in Table 3 plus interaction with institutional measures. The EU-share is included
and treated as exogenous. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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immigrants share increased by 10%. The effect of institutions is now significant but
an order of magnitude smaller and hardly distinguishable from zero. For example, in a
country with a one point higher labor protection the 10% higher immigrants share will
lead to a 0.08% lower native employment for younger men. The effect is even smaller
for older men and very small for men overall. SLS results are more difficult to interpret.
On the one hand, the coefficients for interaction terms are now higher and more similar
to previous specifications. On the other hand, the main immigration effect for old men
is now positive and significant which makes no sense.
When country trends are added the results (not presented) become less tractable and
shows sometimes significant interaction terms (Angrist and Kugler [2003]). We would
rather say that almost no results are significant. We suppose that in the specifications
ignoring the time-trend (like constants institutional indicators) one find a correlation
which presents a common trend in migration and employment. When country trends
are added almost no effect of immigration is found. Restrictive institutions, however,
could worsen any negative influence on employment. Our institutional indicator which
varies over time suggests that in a very restrictive institutional environment with high la-
bor standards immigration would decrease a native employment. Alternatively, it could
be the case that immigration indeed increase native employment in first period and we
found this increase. As it was described in first two sections the effect may switch from
positive to negative over time. We will address this question in the last section.
In total, the results for men are significant and large in comparison with other
studies. This could be explained by strict institutions in Europe. However, these large
influence could be simply a result of common trend in immigration and employment for
men. As we saw no results for men are significant when country trends are included or a
time-varying indicator for institutional environment is used. We will try to review these
findings with more recent data and longer time-series in the next section.
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4 New findings
We now turn to the similar model but using more recent data from Labor Force Survey
(LFS) provided by Eurostat [2012] (see 4). We have panel data for 19 European countries
from 1983 to 2011. We also use the same static institutional indicators as Angrist J.,
Kugler A. (2003) as well as general time-varying OECD indicator. Without explaining
the model specifications in details since they are the same as in the previous section we
will proceed to the discussion of the results.
We begin with IV estimation. The most difficult issue here is, of course, an appropri-
ate instruments. It is quite difficult to find any event, affecting immigration all over the
Europe since immigration policy was very different in different countries. All macroe-
conomic or political shocks affecting population and migration processes are likely to
affect labor markets as well. It turns out, however, that we can still use the instruments
proposed by Angrist and Kugler [2003]. It is not surprising when taking into account
the fact that 60% of our data sample consist of the same time span. New instrument
could be, of course, a way to improve the results but as Table 6, columns (1) and (2),
suggests the distance from Bosnia War center is still a good instrument for non-EU na-
tionals immigration, although the correlation is now lower. The coefficients scaled for a
1000 miles so in countries 500 miles away from War center the share of immigrants is
lower by on average 18%. For EU-nationals we also observe a large negative correlation.
This may reflect a new trend in immigration inflows (other than Balkan wars shock)
in countries that are further away from former Yougoslavia. In any case the distance
could not be influenced by the employment or migration so we can use it to deal with
an endogeneity problem. The inter-war dummy is not significant in any specification
and we therefore do not use it as an instrument in further analysis. To sum up, we have
negative correlation between distance from Sarajevo and external immigration as well
as between both distances and internal immigration.
When country trends are added-columns (3) and (4) - the coefficients for EU-nationals
become insignificant so we can suppose we indeed capture the external war effect by
these instruments as Angrist and Kugler. However, in this specification there is a strong
positive correlation with distance from Pristina for non-EU nationals and this positive
correlation appears before the war years as indicated by a pre-war dummy (although
it becomes much stronger during war years). We could say that in specifications with
trends we capture a new positive tendency in external immigration inflow in countries
that are further away from Prisitna.
Table 7 shows the results for the second stage of SLS estimation separately for men and
women, with and without country trends. In specification without trends an immigrants
share has no effect for both men and women. Internal immigration has a positive effect
for young men only with 10% increase in internal immigrant share increasing native
employment by approximately 1% witch is in accordance with Angrist and Kugler [2003].
When country trends are added immigration effect becomes positive. It is significant
4http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/
data/database
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Table 6: IV: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No trends No trends With trends With trends
Non-nationals
Distance from Sarjevo, Bosnia War -0.368*** -0.360*** -0.0848* -0.109**
(0.0858) (0.0867) (0.0484) (0.0547)
Inter-war dummy -0.232 -0.232 0.0702 0.0694
(0.186) (0.186) (0.132) (0.132)
Distance from Pristina, Kosovo War 0.0560 0.0559 0.491*** 0.491***
(0.138) (0.138) (0.155) (0.155)
Pre-War dummy -0.0316 0.103*
(0.213) (0.0622)
Observations 655 655 655 655
EU-nationals
Distance from Sarjevo, -0.459*** -0.456*** -0.0347 -0.0440
(0.0865) (0.0936) (0.0341) (0.0393)
Inter-war dummy 0.384 0.384 0.0678 0.0678
(0.267) (0.267) (0.129) (0.129)
Distance from Pristina, -0.421** -0.421** -0.0476 -0.0481
(0.187) (0.187) (0.154) (0.154)
Pre-War dummy -0.0156 0.0413
(0.181) (0.0415)
Observations 573 573 573 573
Distance measured from the nearest big city
for younger and older men and is also positive and significant for older women and for
women overall. Immigration inflow increase by 10% will now mean larger women native
employment by 0.75%. Could it be realistic? We suppose this positive effect could be a
result of increasing demand for goods and services from the side of immigrants. This new
demand increases demand for labor force and therefore employment. The EU-share is
also positively significant in this specification for younger and older men and for younger
women.
So, in contrast to theAngrist and Kugler [2003] we found positive effect of immigration
but only when the trend component of immigration share is extracted. This somehow
support our ideas about Angrist and Kuger results being driven by (negative) common
trends. In the longer time series these trends become less strong and the actual positive
effect becomes more obvious.
We now interact the immigration effect with institutions and use OLS estimation as
well as SLS. The results for men could be found in Table 8. OLS estimation gives
the negative immigration effect but for older men only. When we use time-varying
15
Table 7: IV: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled Under 40 Over 40 Pooled Under 40 Over 40
no trends no trends no trends with trends with trends with trends
Men 0.71 -0.10 0.0097 0.013 0.050*** 0.066**
(1.07) (0.083) (0.034) (0.43) (0.010) (0.026)
Observations 215 100 115 215 100 115
Women 0.089 0.15 -0.11 0.075*** 0.012 0.051**
(0.13) (0.11) (0.098) (0.027) (0.040) (0.026)
Observations 235 116 119 235 116 119
Men with EU-share
Immigrants -0.72 -0.14 0.081 -0.15 0.0016 0.0062
(1.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.29) (0.016) (0.016)
EU-share 0.38 0.095*** -0.034 0.13 0.060*** 0.024**
(0.54) (0.035) (0.066) (0.18) (0.015) (0.011)
Observations 172 78 94 172 78 94
Women with EU-share
Immigrants 0.36 -0.32 -0.17 -0.00074 0.0070 0.027
(0.56) (0.65) (0.17) (0.12) (0.026) (0.018)
EU-share -0.16 0.21 0.12 0.031 0.046** -0.0032
(0.31) (0.36) (0.096) (0.075) (0.018) (0.011)
Observations 192 96 96 192 96 96
indicator this negative result appears for younger men as well. What is more interesting
institutional tightness make this negative effect smaller for younger men (labor standards
also for older men). On average, while there is almost no effect of immigration on native
employment, in countries with very protective labor market institutions this effect may
become positive. For example, higher by one standard deviation labor standards will
protect existing workers and increasing demand from new-comers will stimulate new job
creation. As a result native employment will increase.
In case of SLS estimation the results for main effect are pretty the same and positive for
younger men. Positive institutional effect, however, becomes too large to be explained by
institutions solely which may be a result of bad instruments. The effect of replacement
rate is now negative but also too large when considered separately. In specification with
the time-varying indicator no effects are significant.
Although we remember that our instruments are potentially correlated with employ-
ment for women we try to estimate institutional effect for women as well. As shown in
Table 9 the SLS results for women are quite the same as for men. When main effect
is significant it is positive and interaction with institutions is positive and probably too
large. OLS estimation also gives a positive main effect for younger women, although
lower than in case of SLS estimation. Labor standards and high replacement rate make
this positive effect even higher for younger women. Interesting are the results for time-
varying indicator (last panel of the table) because only in this specification we have
negative immigration effect which is however once again unrealistically high. The effect
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Table 8: Interaction with Institutions: Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS SLS SLS SLS
Pooled Under 40 Over 40 Pooled Under 40 Over 40
Labor standards
Main effect -0.019 0.00041 -0.025*** -0.019 -0.090 0.076
(0.067) (0.012) (0.0080) (0.67) (0.085) (0.086)
Labor standards 0.018 0.038*** 0.0098* -0.083 0.11** 0.018
(0.057) (0.012) (0.0057) (0.24) (0.053) (0.043)
Observations 280 138 142 172 78 94
Replacement rate
Main effect -0.0092 0.023 -0.020** 0.36 0.069** 0.058
(0.066) (0.016) (0.0082) (0.51) (0.034) (0.069)
Replacement rate 0.010 0.026** 0.0065 -0.79 -0.13*** -0.20**
(0.046) (0.011) (0.0048) (0.68) (0.043) (0.096)
Observations 280 138 142 172 78 94
Entry Barriers
Main effect -0.014 0.014 -0.024*** 0.26 0.089* 0.088
(0.061) (0.017) (0.0079) (0.71) (0.053) (0.13)
Entry barriers 0.0025 0.012 0.010 0.43 0.30** 0.057
(0.054) (0.020) (0.0063) (1.42) (0.15) (0.11)
Observations 290 143 147 172 78 94
All three institutions
Main effect -0.026 -0.0031 -0.022** 0.072 0.074*** 0.018
(0.084) (0.018) (0.011) (0.33) (0.019) (0.019)
Labor standards 0.028 0.042** 0.0051 -0.051 0.0082 0.0038
(0.090) (0.019) (0.0091) (0.19) (0.017) (0.012)
Replacement rate 0.0039 0.017 -0.0018 -0.18 -0.076*** -0.071***
(0.069) (0.018) (0.0071) (0.31) (0.029) (0.018)
Entry barriers -0.020 -0.032* 0.0091 0.021 0.13*** 0.084**
(0.068) (0.016) (0.0075) (0.63) (0.047) (0.035)
Observations 280 138 142 172 78 94
Labor protection (OECD)
Main effect -0.045 -0.058*** -0.036*** 0.78 -0.25 0.073
(0.12) (0.019) (0.012) (1.60) (0.21) (0.13)
Labor protection 0.012 0.031*** 0.0031 -0.20 0.10 -0.0099
(0.053) (0.0094) (0.0057) (0.46) (0.065) (0.043)
Observations 318 157 161 168 76 92
EU-share is included and treated as exogenous
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Interaction with Institutions: Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS SLS SLS SLS
Pooled Under 40 Over 40 Pooled Under 40 Over 40
Labor standards
Main effect 0.0149 0.0163 0.0135 -0.0188 -0.0899 0.0764
(0.0365) (0.0100) (0.0174) (0.667) (0.0851) (0.0862)
Labor standards 0.0340 0.0492*** 0.0188 -0.0827 0.114** 0.0177
(0.0358) (0.0107) (0.0158) (0.239) (0.0535) (0.0430)
Observations 308 154 154 172 78 94
Replacement rate
Main effect 0.0305 0.0454*** 0.0157 0.0403 0.0980** 0.0863
(0.0328) (0.0141) (0.0205) (0.261) (0.0399) (0.164)
Replacement rate 0.0151 0.0334*** -0.00311 -0.108 -0.102 -0.358*
(0.0295) (0.00933) (0.0122) (0.505) (0.0925) (0.203)
Observations 308 154 154 192 96 96
Entry barriers
Main effect 0.0198 0.0309** 0.00870 0.391 0.0291 -0.144
(0.0294) (0.0148) (0.0176) (0.660) (0.147) (0.256)
Entry barriers 0.00283 0.0134 -0.00773 -0.0623 0.0748 -0.186
(0.0308) (0.0187) (0.0112) (0.550) (0.134) (0.432)
Observations 318 159 159 192 96 96
All three institutions
Main effect -0.00564 0.0106 -0.0219 0.0700 0.109 -0.0376
(0.0323) (0.0147) (0.0219) (0.166) (0.0665) (0.0424)
Labor standards 0.0627* 0.0594*** 0.0659*** 0.0960 0.0960** 0.0728**
(0.0344) (0.0181) (0.0215) (0.0871) (0.0419) (0.0348)
Replacement rate -0.00296 0.0223 -0.0282** 0.0292 0.101 -0.0791
(0.0260) (0.0163) (0.0139) (0.188) (0.101) (0.0600)
Entry barriers -0.0363 -0.0453*** -0.0273 0.0702 0.137 -0.117
(0.0262) (0.0167) (0.0180) (0.253) (0.135) (0.0897)
Observations 308 154 154 192 96 96
Labor protection (OECD)
Main effect -0.044 -0.070*** -0.019 0.25 -0.11 -0.25**
(0.081) (0.014) (0.031) (0.57) (0.16) (0.10)
Labor protection 0.037 0.047*** 0.027** -0.0040 0.086 0.13***
(0.035) (0.0077) (0.014) (0.16) (0.052) (0.042)
Observations 346 173 173 184 92 92
EU-share is included and treated as exogenous
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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of protective institutions is still positiver.
To check whether some results are come from common trend we repeat all the esti-
mation adding country specific trends. Without presenting the tables we will describe
the significant coefficients only5. OLS estimation for men gives positive main effect co-
efficient which equals on average 0.04. The only significant institutional effect is labor
standards (approximately 0.03). With SLS estimation none of the results are signifi-
cant. In OLS estimation the main effect is significant and positive for younger women
and shows approximately 0.4 percentage response for 10% increase in immigrant share.
Labor standards make this effect larger. SLS estimation provides positive main effect
for older women only in specification with all three institutions and no other significant
results. One should remember, however, that female employment in Europe is, as a rule,
lower than the male one. Therefore small changes in levels will give quite big changes
in percentage points.
To conclude, we have found that for men the main effect of immigration inflow on
the native employment is negative and in accordance with Angrist and Kugker (2003)
results. But this results are sensitive to the inclusion of country trends and, probably,
reflect only this trend correlation. A strict institutional environment protects existing
workers and makes this negative effect smaller or even positive. For women, in contrast,
the main effect is positive and strict institutions make it larger as well. The results
provided by IV estimation for women seem to be unreliable to draw any conclusions. So
the problem of finding better instruments is a potential issue for further analysis.
Positive effect of immigration for women could be explained by high demand of new-
comers on some special services. Woman are more likely to work on part-time positions
and overrepresented in service sector (seeEurostat [2011], Melkas and R. [2001] and
L. Dijk [2002]). Increasing demand for goods and services raise a labor demand and
therefore employment in this spheres. Protective labor market institutions save existing
workers from being replaced and the overall employment is therefore increased. However,
as it was discussed in the Introduction, active participation in goods market and not so
active in labor market is more likely on the initial stages after immigration. This raise a
question about the dynamics of the immigration effect. The specification used by Angrist
and Kugler implies that the effect is immediate and permanent. They therefore study a
long-term effect of immigration and institutions in equilibrium. As it was discussed in
previous sections some papers focus on dynamic dimension of this influence and we will
as well in the next section.
5All the results discussed it the paper could be found in our STATA-code
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5 Dynamic Specification
As we discussed already it is quite natural to suppose that the effect of immigration is
not permanent but changing over time. Immigrants enter a product market more quickly
than labor market. So immigration inflow boosts a product demand and therefore a labor
demand first and only on the later stages progressively increases labor supply (Z. and
Yashiv [2002]).
Moreover, the main assumption about protective institutions covering natives rather
than new-comers seems to be more plausible in short-run. When an immigrant had
came to the country, for instance, 5 years ago, it is unlikely that he is still unaware of
his rights on labor market and existing protective institutions or that he is still working
illegally. To sum up, the effect could be different in short and long-run.
Along with Jean and Jimnez [2011] paper we will consider the following specification
yjt = α + µj + δt + β1jt+ (λ0 + λ1xjt)yj(t−1) +
L∑
l=0
(α0l + α1lxjt)∆sj(t−l)+
+ (αLR0 + αLR1xjt)sj(t−L−1) + jt (4)
Since we use lags it is not necessary to employ a logarithmic specification. yjt is a
native employment as before, µj is a country dummy, δt - year dummy, β1jt - country
specific trend, xjt is an institution indicator, we use both a time-varying indicator and
constant indicators from Angrist and Kugler [2003], expressed in standard deviations.
∆sj(t−l) represents lagged changes in immigrant share and sj(t−L−1) is the lagged level, L
is a maximum number of lags. The reason to include the first lag of dependent variable
yj(t−1) is, as before, an endogenity issue. This term controls for previous labor market
outcomes (shocks). In contrast to Jean and Jimnez [2011] we do not include any measure
of macroeconomic shocks except this control6.
The model focuses on a time profile of immigration shocks and represents an ”impulse-
response” idea (Jean and Jimnez [2011]). Parameters of interest are αs. α0l indicates
a temporary impact of change in immigrant share on employment level l periods ahead
and α1l shows how this impact is affected by a labor policy, i.e. institutions. αLR0 and
αLR1 capture the effect of lagged level which remains after all the temporary influence
died out. This could be interpreted as a long-term effect.
The first question for estimation is how many lags to include. Jean, Jimnez found no
significant short-run effect after three years and therefore include 5 lags. We will use the
same approach. For more precise identification one could use additional statistical tests.
Next step is to choose an estimation strategy. Jean, Jimnez used fixed-effect feasible
GLS accounting for heteroscedasticity across panel. However, a presence of fixed effects
in a lagged-dependent-variable model makes the yt−1 endogenous by construction. We
can also face a problem with autocorrelation in y when the time-series become longer.
Moreover, we are not sure that we completely eliminate endogenity by introducing a
6As Jean, Jimnez pointed out themselves, inclusion of this macro shocks is aguable (see Blanchard
and Wolfers [2000]
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control for previous market shocks and finding good instruments could be a tricky task
as it was discussed above. Assuming that the error-term jt is not serially correlated,
we used an estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond [1991] with generalized method
of moments (gmm) estimation. The main idea is to take first differences to eliminate an
individual effect and use past lags of variables (or lags of variables changes) as instru-
ments7. We begin with estimation of immigration effect without institutions. Results of
both methods could be found in Table10.
Table 10: Dynamic Effect of Immigration
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES FGLS Arelano-Bond GMM Arelano-Bond with EU-share
L.e p 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.95***
(0.0031) (0.029) (0.036)
D.Imm -0.0086 -0.018** -0.015
(0.0092) (0.0085) (0.018)
LD.Imm -0.015 -0.034*** -0.032
(0.011) (0.013) (0.033)
L2D.Imm -0.018 -0.047** -0.045
(0.015) (0.019) (0.050)
L3D.Imm -0.018 -0.058** -0.054
(0.019) (0.025) (0.067)
L4D.Imm -0.016 -0.064** -0.062
(0.023) (0.030) (0.078)
L5D.Imm -0.045 -0.15** -0.17*
(0.047) (0.062) (0.095)
L6D.Imm 0.0025 -0.11* -0.12
(0.042) (0.064) (0.10)
L7D.Imm -0.032 -0.18*** -0.20*
(0.031) (0.065) (0.11)
L8.Imm -0.039 -0.20*** -0.18
(0.039) (0.074) (0.12)
L8.eu lf1 0.014*
(0.0072)
Observations 585 515 442
R-squared 0.998
Number of id 62 62
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
7We also implicitly assume that lagged differences which used as instruments for level-variables, st−L−1
in our case, are uncorrelated with unobservable country specific effects.
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In the table L’s denote lags and D’s differences. For, example, L2D.Imm is here
the second lag of difference in immigrant share, D.Imm is the first difference (current
change), L.Employment is the first lag of dependent variable.
In both specifications the first lag of employment is strongly significant meaning a high
degree of persistence in employment shocks. Jean, Jimnez also get a significant coefficient
0.68 for the first lag of employment, and approximately 0.4 for the second and the third
lags of difference in immigration share. This results become smaller or insignificant when
controls for macroeconomic shocks are added. They found no significant coefficient for
lagged level of immigrants share in any specification meaning no long-term effect. Our
results from FGLS are pretty the same and show no long-run effect of immigration on
employment. In contrast to FGLS, an Arelano-Bond estimator shows significant and
negative effect of change in immigration inflow during the first 7 years and then also a
long-term effect -0.2. These effects disappear except ffor 5th and 7th lags when EU-share
control is added. Unfortunately, we can not check the autocorrelation assumption by
estat abond test because of unbalanced panel.
Table 11 then shows the results for interaction with institutions. In all the models the
first lag of employment has significant and strong influence on today’s employment. In
case of replacement rate (RR) the first lag of difference in immigration share also matters
(when we do not control for EU-share) and this influence is positive. Moreover, this
positive influence becomes larger if replacement rate increases. This could mean that
in the first year immigrants participate mostly in product market increasing product
demand and therefore a demand for labor force. This positive shock could be amplified
by internal demand if replacement rates (and therefore income of retired people) are
higher. Entry barriers (EB) do not influence displacement effect in native employment
and change in immigration share is also insignificant in this specification. The same
situation is observed in case of Labor standards (LS) for short-term effect. The long-run
effect of immigration is positive in this case (when do not control on EU-share).
Unfortunately, the estimates for OECD time-varying indicator (not presented) is very
sensitive to the number of lags included and coefficient have mostly sign and magnitude
which is difficult to interpret. FGLS estimation (not presented), in contrast, provides
no significant result for any number of lags in this case. Either there is indeed no
influence of labor protection institutions,that are included in the OECD indicator, on
immigration displacement effect or it could be also the case that the trend in labor
protection development is simply correlated with immigration. Namely, countries with
larger immigration inflow create more protective institutions for natives.
We should also note that EU-share included as a control has a positive coefficient
which confirms the ideas about internal immigration offsetting the negative effect of
external immigration.
To sum up, the immigration inflow has on average no effect on native employment
during the first years and could have negative effect after 5-7 periods while in the long-
run no effect is observed. When protective labor market institutions are considered,
the short-run effect of immigration is found to be positive. Institutions, namely first
difference in replacement rate, have, as in the static specification, positive effect on
employment level in the next period. Overall we confirm our ideas about positive effect
22
of new-comers on native employment level and protective institutions saving jobs of
existing workers. We now have an evidence that such an effect is temporary and that
there is no long run effects observed.
6 Conclusion
This paper reviews some results about immigration displacement effect. A question of
special interest was a policy implication issue. Could the labor policy protect existing
workers or will it only increase costs of hiring native workers and result in natives loosing
their jobs. This topic is of great interest and importance since an immigration policy
becomes more important in Europe nowadays. Many countries try to develop new labor
market regulations in order to stimulate employment and at the same time provide
immigrants a possibility for integration.
After replication of the Angrist and Kugler [2003] results, this paper used the same
specification and instruments to estimate the same effect on more recent data. The effect
of immigrant share for men is found to be negative. However, this result is sensitive to
the inclusion of country specific trends and may simply reflect a negative correlation
between immigration inflows and instruments. When country trends are added there is
no effect in almost all specification. The effect for women is positive in contrast to the
original paper. When the share of immigrants increases by 10% a native employment
of women increased by on average 0.4%. This could be explained by the fact that the
new-comers increase a country demand for goods and services which in turn raises a
demand for labor force. Women could be more sensitive to this shock because of some
specific features of women employment in Europe such as occupation in services or high
rate of part-time employment.
The paper shows also that protective labor market institutions fulfill their function of
protecting existing workers. More stringent labor standards or replacement rate mitigate
negative immigration effect or amplify positive effect. The dynamic specification sug-
gests, however, that both immigration and institutional effects are quite temporary and
disappear after one year. This specification provides also no evidence of any long-term
effect of immigration.
Although the paper lefts an open question about more appropriate instruments, it
shows no support to the idea of negative effect of protective institutions or amplification
of immigration displacement effect.
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Table 11: Dynamic Effect, Iteration with Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RR RR with EU EB EB with EU LS LS with EU
L.employment 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.97***
(0.024) (0.037) (0.026) (0.041) (0.024) (0.037)
D. 0.019 0.040 0.012 -0.0042 0.044 0.046
(0.025) (0.034) (0.032) (0.058) (0.030) (0.039)
LD. 0.051** 0.090** 0.028 -0.018 0.017 0.018
(0.026) (0.043) (0.037) (0.096) (0.031) (0.055)
L2D. 0.018 0.082 0.033 -0.029 0.00069 -0.0017
(0.028) (0.056) (0.043) (0.14) (0.036) (0.078)
L3D. -0.034 0.049 0.0081 -0.090 -0.026 -0.036
(0.034) (0.073) (0.052) (0.18) (0.046) (0.11)
L4D. 0.00076 0.10 0.010 -0.090 0.0080 -0.028
(0.038) (0.090) (0.060) (0.21) (0.051) (0.13)
L5D. 0.025 0.12 0.012 -0.15 0.035 -0.031
(0.043) (0.082) (0.071) (0.25) (0.057) (0.15)
D.Imm 0.025 0.021 0.013 0.036 0.014 0.037
(0.033) (0.038) (0.031) (0.040) (0.011) (0.032)
LD.Imm 0.066* 0.057 0.027 0.057 0.0023 0.044
(0.035) (0.045) (0.036) (0.056) (0.013) (0.056)
L2D.Imm 0.024 0.014 0.039 0.084 -0.00023 0.056
(0.038) (0.051) (0.041) (0.071) (0.014) (0.082)
L3D.Imm -0.044 -0.056 0.020 0.073 -0.0065 0.075
(0.046) (0.066) (0.050) (0.096) (0.018) (0.11)
L4D.Imm 0.0076 -0.0020 0.030 0.11 0.012 0.096
(0.050) (0.065) (0.056) (0.10) (0.020) (0.13)
L5D.Imm 0.043 0.012 0.058 0.11 0.027 0.11
(0.050) (0.068) (0.060) (0.11) (0.030) (0.14)
L6.neu rr1 0.013 0.079 0.0099 -0.36 -0.016 -0.20
(0.047) (0.086) (0.077) (0.27) (0.031) (0.15)
L6.Imm 0.057 0.028 0.076 0.13 0.050* 0.20
(0.057) (0.075) (0.031) (0.15)
L6. 0.24*** 0.36*** 0.29***
(0.083) (0.091) (0.080)
Observations 485 382 497 394 485 382
Number of id 54 54 58 58 54 54
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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